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REVELATION.
In my childhood I was told that there were two
kinds of divine revelation. God had revealed him-
self (i) in Nature, and (2) in the Scriptures. Neither
revelation was easy to decipher and interpret, but God
always aids the endeavors of the upright, and the
one revelation would assist us in understanding the
other.
There is, too, according to the catechisms, a third
kind of revelation : the Conscience of Man. Man has
an instinctive recognition of that which is right and
that which is wrong, and this instinct is sometimes
a most wonderful and accurate guide, although there
are many cases in which it leads astray. Conscience,
we are told, is the voice of God, and the behests
of conscience we are bound tti obey, although we
must be on our guard lest conscience be perverted by
errors and superstitions.
These three revelations of God must be one and
the same. If they are true and reliable they must
agree, and wherever they do not agree our interpre-
tation of one of them, or of two, or of all them, is
wrong. As a matter of fact, we find that the three
conflict, and we must accordingly investigate which of
the three is the most reliable.
The dogmatic Christian claims that the Bible is
the most reliable ; and in all religious matters the
Bible must be considered as the ultimate authority.
Yet, whatever precious doctrines the Bible may con-
tain, it can be considered as divine only in so ia.t as
it is true, and God cannot proclaim one truth in na-
ture, and another truth in the Scriptures. He cannot
be one God to all the world, and another God to a few
prophets. God might reveal himself more fully to
those who are maturer in mind, whose souls are fur-
ther advanced in moral and mental growth, for God
reveals himself to the extent that we search for him,
and are able to comprehend the truth. Yet the two
revelations should never be contradictory. They might
be different in degree, but not in kind.
Of the three divine revelations there is but one that
is consistent, one that never contradicts itself, that
has remained unchanged, and will remain so forever.
That is the revelation of God in Nature. There is
order in nature, and law rules supreme. All natural
phenomena are in all their glorious variety so many
instances of the oneness that pervades nature, and
among all the natural phenomena, the most wonderful
revelation of God appears in man ; and in that which
is most human in man, in language, and in thought.
Every truth is divine, every truth is a revelation, and
every scripture thus inspired will prove useful in work-
ing out righteousness. Therefore we agree with the
apostle when he says :
Every scripture inspired of God is also profitable for teaching,
for reproof, for correction, for instruction, which is in righteous-
ness : that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely
unto every good work. -11. thim., 3, 16. 17.
It is not the Bible alone which is a revelation of
God, but the Vedas, the Zendavesta, Homer, the
Koran, the Edda ; Shakespeare, and Goethe ; and
Kant and Darwin, and all the scientists. All the
scriptures, all the literatures of all people so far as
they contain thoughts that are noble and elevating,
and beautiful and true—they are all revelations of
God. In so far as a book contains errors it is not de-
vine, it is no revelation of God, whether it be incor-
porated in the biblical canon or not.
The Bible was considered by the old Hebrews in
this light, for the Old Testament is nothing but a
collection of the Hebrew literature up to a certain
date. Had Goethe lived among the Jews at the time
of David, and had the anachronism been possible
that he had written his Faust at that time; Goethe's
Faust would be one of the canonical books in the
Bible of to-day.
Conscience, it is true, is a revelation of God; but
what is conscience but the development of the ethical
instinct in man.
Experience has taught man that certain acts that
promise to be pleasant at first, will cause regret after-
wards; that the injury done to others will not bring
to him the benefit he expected, but may even entail
harm which he never thought of. Experience will
teach him that self-denial and unflinching love of truth,
even where they appear very obnoxious, will in the
end prove to be the best. Conscience accordingly is
ultimately based upon experience, not only of our-
selves, but of parents and teachers. It is partly an
inherited tendency
;
partly it is based upon all the re-
membrances of our life from earliest childhood. The
examples given us by beloved and respected persons,
2278 THE OPKN COURT.
by our elders and by our friends, are written in our
souls and will consciously and unconsciously influence
our actions. It is neither uncommon nor strange that
the voice of man's conscience is often perverted, by
bad examples and insufficient or wrong instruction. As
the knowledge of the medicine man is the rude be-
ginning of science; so is conscience a natural product
which needs refinement and culture by methodical
education.
The only direct and reliable revelation of God is
to be found in the facts of nature ; and all the other
revelations in the Scriptures, and in conscience, are but
parts of this one and only true revelation. They are
true only in so far as they agree and represent this ;
and the truth of this can be revised again and again.
The book of nature is open to every one, and in the
places where to- day we understand its disclosures im-
perfectly, we can hope that to-morrow by more careful
observations and closer investigations, we shall better
comprehend its meaning.
Truth is the exactness with which the harmony of
cosmic order is represented in the mind of a thinking
being ; truth is the mark of divine dignity in man,
through truth and truthfulness we become children of
God, and truth is the saviour of all evil.
THE NATURAL ORIGIN OF THE SUPERNATURAL.*
BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MULLER.
It was formerly supposed that there were only
three forms of religion possible, Polytheism, Mono-
theism, and Atheism. But in the Veda, and elsewhere
also, it has become necessary to distinguish Poly-
theism from a previous stage which may best be called
Henotheism. What we- mean by Polytheism is a be-
lief in many gods, who, by the very fact that they are
many, and stand side by side, are limited in their di-
vine character. They generally form together a kind
of Pantheon, and are mostly, though not always, rep-
resented as subject to a supreme God.
Polytheism, therefore, implies the admission of a
number of beings who all claim a kind of equality, so
far as their divine character is concerned, who are con-
ceived in fact as members of one class, and whose di-
vinity is consequently a limited divinit}', or, if we
hold that divinity cannot be limited, no true divinity
at all. But there are clear traces of a totally different
phase of religious thought in the Veda.
No doubt, the number of gods invoked in the hymns
of the Rig Veda is very considerable, and in this
sense the Vedic religion may be called polytheistic.
In many hymns where different gods are invoked to-
gether, the conception of divinity shared by them all
is as limited as in Homer. But there are other hymns
in which the poet seems to know, for the time being,
* From a Report in the London Christian World, copies of which were
kindly sent us by Prof. Max M Oiler.
of one single god only. That single god is to him the
only god, and in the momentary vision of the poet
his divinity is not limited by the thought of any other
god. This phase of thought, this worship, not of
many, nor of one only god, but of a single god, I
call Henotheism, a name which has been accepted by
the most competent authorities as representing an im-
portant phase in the development of religious ideas.
It may be that India, where social life was chiefly
developed in families, clans, and village communities,
favored the growth and permanence of this worship
of single deities more than any other country ; but,
from a psychological point of view, it seems as if all
polytheism must have passed through this previous
phase, as if everywhere, whether consciously or un-
consciously, the progress must have been from the
single to the many, and finally to the one. But, apart
from all theories, the fact remains that in the religious
childhood of India, as represented to us in the hymns
of the Veda, we can see this henotheistic tendency
fully developed. We can see a poet, or a family, or a
clan, or a village believing in this or that god as for
the time and for certain purposes the only God, yet
quite ready, under new circumstances, to invoke the
help of another god who again stands supreme, or
more correctly stands alone, before the mind of the
suppliant as his only helper in distress.
It will be admitted that nothing of what is called
supernatural, no miracles in the modern sense of that
word, no superhuman revelation were required to ac-
count for the simple and perfectl}' intelligible evolu-
tion of the concept of deity. What should we give
if in any realm of nature we could watch that won-
derful process of evolution, of growth or development,
so clearly as here in the realm of thought ? If some
students of physical science come to us and tell us of
the great discovery of evolution in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and express a hope that we also, we poor meta-
physicians, and psychologists, and philologists should
become evolutionists, one hardly knows what to sa}'.
What have we been doing all this time but trying to
understand how things have become what they are,
how by a few roots, language by an uninterrupted
growth developed into the endless varieties, now scat-
tered all over the world—how from a few simple con-
cepts the infinitude of thought was evolved which rep-
resents the intellectual wealth of the world, andliow
philosophers, as distant from one another as Kant and
Thales, are, nevertheless, held together by an unseen
chain in the historical march that led them nearer and
nearer to the truth.
Really, to be told, as we were lately by Professor
Romanes in his ' Origin of Human Faculty,' that the
idea that language was the result of natural growth,
could not be appreciated in its full significance before
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the advent of the general theory of evohition, that
' till the middle of the present century the possibility
of language having been the result of a natural growth
was not sufficiently recognized,' and that it was the
same year that witnessed the publication of the
"Origin of Species" (1859) which gave to science
the first issue of Steinthal's Zeitschrift fiir Volker-
psychologie und Sprachwissenschafi, ' is enough to take
away one's breath. I see that the sentences are very
cautiouslj' framed, but for all that they cannot but
mislead. The idea of evolution was more fully recog-
nized and more clearly defined by the students of lan-
guage than it has ever been by the students of nature,
and they certainly did not wait for the advent in 1859
before explaining what was meant by genealogical,
what by morphological classification, what was meant
by dialects, by families of speech, what was meant by
the constant elimination of useless words, which is but
another, a more correct name for natural selection.
If Professor Romanes says, ' Even Professor Max
Miiller insists that no student of the science of lan-
guage can be anything but an evolutionist, for, where-
ever he looks, he sees nothing but evolution going on
all around him,' what is the meaning of that even?
Even before Professor Romanes joined the ranks of
evolutionists, I had greeted in the warmest terms the
discourses of Darwin, as a biologist, because they
lent such strong support to the theories put forward
long ago by comparative philologists, and thus en-
abled them to see many things far more clearly, by
their analogies with his theories.
Unfortunately, Darwin had been misinformed as
to the results obtained by the science of language,
having consulted some personal friends whom he
trusted, and who were not competent to give the nec-
essary information. It was in the interest of the true
theory of evolution, in support of true against false
Darwinism, that I published my criticism of Darwin's
views on language, not as an opponent of the theory
of evolution. That theory has no stronger fortress
than the science of language, of thought, and of re-
ligion. For it is here that evolution stands before us
as a simple fact, and not, as is so often the case in
nature, as a mere hope and desire. We have here no
missing links, but one perfect and unbroken chain.
Many philosophers, many historians, many stu-
dents of the evolution of the human mind, unassisted
by any but the great natural miracles by which it finds
itself surrounded from the first moments of its con-
scious life, might have reached the concept of gods,
such as we find it in the ancient religions of the world,
in what have often been called natural religions as dis-
tinct from supernatural religions. But they would de-
mur if asked to admit that the highest concepts of
God, such as we find it among the Jews, Christians,
and possibly among the Mohammedans, was within
the reach of unassisted human reason. We need not
inquire why they should have so strong a wish that it
should be so, and why others should wish with the
same intensity that it should not be so. If it can be
shown that the highest and purest concept of deity
has been the result of a natural and perfectly intelli-
gible evolution, all we have to do is to study the facts
which history has preserved to us, and then to draw
our own conclusions. Let those who hold that the
highest concept of deity is unattainable without a
special revelation, put down those attributes of deity
which they believe are outside the ken of natural re-
ligion, and if there remain any that cannot be matched,
let us then freely admit that these were unattainable
by man as placed in this world, though it is a world of
unceasing miracle and of never-ending revelation.
There is one powerful prejudice against which all
believers in evolution have to guard. When we see
the last result of an evolution we are loth to identify
it with its simple and often apparently very mean be-
ginnings. When we see' the mouth of the Thames,
which can be as wild and as terrific as the ocean it-
self, we can hardly believe that it began with the few
trickling rills on the south-eastern slope of the Cots-
wolds. When we look up to towering branches of an
ancient oak-tree, we cannot realize how it should have
sprung from one of those small decaying acorns that
lie scattered round its roots. And when we admire
the beauty of a full-grown man, we almost shrink
from the idea that not many years ago that noblest
work of nature was nothing but a plastic cell, undis-
tinguishable, to our eyes at least, from any other cell
that might in time grow into a dog or an ape.
It is the same with our words. Their original
meaning is often so commonplace and so material that
nothing but downright facts can force us to believe
that, for instance, such abstract terms as to perceive,
and to conceive, are derived from capio, to- lay hands
on a thing. But because aspiration and inspiration
come from the same source as respiration and perspi-
ration, they lose nothing of that sublirne meaning
with which in the course of time they have been in-
vested. If, therefore, we should find that the highest
and purest concept of divinitj' had slowly been elab-
orated out of the primitive material concept of fire,
that would in no way lower the divine concept. On
the contrary, it would only serve to impress upon our
minds the same lesson which nature teaches us again
and again, namely, that the highest achievements are
often connected by a continuous growth with the mean-
est beginnings, and that we are not to call common or
unclean what has been cleansed by the Spirit.
Can we ourselves form a much more sublime con-
ception of the Deity than what we see the conception
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of Agni to have become in the Veda? Of Agni, the
fire, there is little, nay, there is nothing, left in that
supreme god whose laws must be obeyed, and who
can at the same time forgive those who have broken
his laws, nay, who can promise to those who worship
him eternal life. It is quite true that by the side of
these sublime conceptions we find also the most
l.omely and childish ideas entertained of Agni by some
of the Vedic poets. But that is not now the question.
There is an ebb and flow in all religions. We want
to know the highest mark which the tide of Vedic re-
ligion has ever reached in order to understand what
the human mind, left face to face with the natural
revelation of this world, can achieve. Trusting to the
fragments that have been preserved to us in the Veda,
10 the remains of the most childish as well as the most
exalted thoughts, we may say that natural religion, or
the natural faculties of man under the dominion of the
natural impressions of the world around us, can lead,
nay, has led, man step by step to a conception of deity
which can hardly be surpassed by any of those well-
known definitions of deity which so-called supernatural
religions have hitherto claimed as their exclusive
propert}'. These are either facts or no facts, but if
they are facts they should be accepted and inwardly
digested in the same spirit in which St. Paul accepted
and inwardly digested the facts that met his eyes when
standing before the very altars of the heathen world :
'Whom ye ignorantly worship,' he said, 'him declare
I unto you '—not a new god, not a god different in
origin from their own, but the same god who had been
ignorantly worshipped in the childhood of the world,
who is ignorantly worshipped even now, but for whom
the human heart and the human mind have always
sought, in the bounds of their habitation, if haply they
might feel after him and find him, though he be not
far from every one of us.
The traditions of the Old Testament as finally col-
lected by 'Ezra hardly allow us to doubt that a belief
in one Supreme God, even if at first it was only a
henotheistic and not yet a monotheistic belief, took
possession of the leading spirits of the Jewish race at
a very early time. All tradition assigns that belief in
one God, the Most High, to Abraham. Abraham,
though he did not deny the existence of the gods wor-
shipped by the neighboring tribes, yet looked upon
them as different from, and as decidedly inferior to,
his own God. This monotheism was no doubt narrow.
His God was the friend of Abraham, as Abraham was
the friend of God. Yet the concept of God formed by
Abraham was a concept that could grow and that did
grow. Neither Moses, nor the prophets, nor Christ
Himself, nor Mohammed had to introduce a new God.
Their God was always called the God of Abraham,
even when freed from all that was still local and nar-
row and superstitious in the faith of Abraham. But
although Abraham ma}' have attained at a very earl}'
time to his sublime conception of the one God, the
Most High God, freed from the purely physical char-
acteristics which adhere to the gods of other nations,
we can see very clearly that in this sublime concep-
tion he stood almost alone, and that the gods of the
Jews and of the Semitic nations in general had once
been gods of nature, quite as much as the gods of India
.
What is told of Elijah and of his vision of Mount
Horeb is like an epitome of the whole growth of the
Jewish religion. The best authorities on the religious
antiquities of the Semitic peoples, and of the Jewish
people in particular, have expressed their conviction
that the physical characteristics of their principal god
point to an original god of fire, taking fire in the same
wide sense in which it was taken in India, not only as
the fire on earth, but as the fire of heaven, the fire
manifested in storm and -lightning. In this way only,
they think, can we account for the poetical phraseol-
ogy still found in many places of the Old Testament.
I know full well that to some, any attempt to trace
back the name and concept of Jehovah to the same
hidden sources from which other nations derived their
first intimation of deity, may seem almost sacrilegious.
They forget the difference between the human con-
cept of the deity and the deity itself, which is beyond
the reach of all human concepts. But the historian
reads deeper lessons in the growth of these human
concepts, as they spring up everywhere in the minds
of men who have been seekers after truth—seeking
the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find
Him—and when he can show the slow but healthy
growth of the noblest and sublimest thoughts out of
small and apparently insignificant beginnings, he re-
joices as the laborer rejoices over his golden harvest
;
nay he often wonders which is more truly wonderful,
the butterfly that soars up to heaven on its silvery
wings, or the grub that hides within its mean chrysalis
such marvelous possibilities.
I have tried to show you, chiefly from the evidence
preserved to us in the hymns of the Rig-veda, how
the human mind, by its natural, though at the same
time most wonderful powers, can reach and did reach
the highest conception of the godhead. I took my
first illustration from fire. Nothing seems to us more
natural than that the various manifestations of fire
should have been marked and named by the earliest
inhabitants of the world. Yet if we restricted the mean-
ing of natural to whatever animals, or beings endowed
with sense only, are capable of performing, we should
have to call the naming of fire, achieved by man and
by man alone, not a natural, but a supernatural, or, at
all events, a super-animal act. Formerly it would
hardly have been necessary to insist on this distinc-
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tion. But at present, when philosophy seems chiefly
to consist in ignoring the frontier hnes that separate
the animal kingdom from our own, it is necessary to
show that there are certain limits to the mental faculty
of mere animals.
Animals may be scared by fire and run away from
it, but they will never name and conceive it. When
we see our fire burning, and hear it crackling in the
grate, nothing seems to us more homely, more nat-
ural ; but try to think once more what the first ap-
pearance of fire must have been. When it came down
from the sky as lightning, killing a man and setting
his hut ablaze, surely there was a miracle if ever there
was a miracle, a theophony if ever there was a the-
ophony. And when, after a time, the beneficial
aspects of fire had been discovered, when certain
families had found out how to elicit fire from flints,
or how to produce it by friction, the mystery re-
mained as great as ever. It was a weird power, a
strange apparition, a something totally inexplicable
to the human understanding. Thus there remained
in the fire from the first, even after it had been named,
something unknown, something different from all or-
dinary and finite perceptions, something not natural,
something unnatural, or as it was also called, some-
thing supernatural. If we once see this clearly and
understand how the supernatural element was there
from the beginning, though not yet disentangled from
its natural surroundings, we can see now also how it
was the same supernatural element that lent itself to
that wonderful growth in the human mind which we
watched in the hj'mns of the ancient poets of the Veda,
so that in the end Agni—fire—after being stripped of
all that was purely phenomenal, natural, and phys-
ical, stands before us, endowed with all those qualities
which we reserve for the Supreme Being, and was
adored as the creator and ruler of the world as om-
nipotent, omniscient, just, kind, and compassionate.
In that state all his physical antecedents were for-
gotten. It was no longer the fire crackling on the
hearth that was believed in as the creator of the world.
It was the unknown agent, recognized from the first
in that motion which we call fire, that had been raised
to a divine dignity, though the old name of Agni re-
mained as if to remind people of their first acquaint-
ance with him, whom they called from the first the
friend of man, 'the immortal among mortals.'
We are told that Agni, as soon as born, devoured
his father and mother—an allusion to the fact that fire
sticks were often destro5'ed by the flames they kin-
dled—a statement startling enough to take its place
among mythological stories. If such a story, instead
of being told of Agni, were told of Angrias, another,
but no longer an understood name of fire, we should
have had at once one of those myths which have formed
such stumbling-blocks tq Mr. Herbert Spencer and
other students of ethnology. These philosophers v ish
to account for everything in the development of the
human race rationalistically. They want to discover
a reason for these unspeakable atrocities of which the
gods and heroes even of such progressive races as the
Indians, the Greeks, Romans, and Teutons are be
lieved to have been guilty. Their way out of the dif-
ficulty is certainly very ingenious and very simple
;
but is it supported by any evidence? First of all, they
tell us that they see no reason why such names as
Fire, or Sun, or Dawn should not be accepted as names
of real individuals who lived a long time ago. They
prove from the London Post-Office Directory that
even now some people are called Fire, Dawn, and
Sun. As to the atrocities ascribed to these individuals,
they recognize in them what they call survivals of an
earlier savage and half brutal state, when the ances-
tors of the Hindus, Greeks, Romans, and Teutons
were quite capable of eating their parents, like Agni,
or Mr. Fire, or of eating their children, like Kronos,
or Mr. Time. lam not exaggerating, I am only abbrevi-
ating, and therefore, perhaps, representing the theories
of Mr. Herbert Spencer and other Euhemerists in a
too naked and, therefore, in a less persuasive and
attractive form. Of course, when we are carried off
into pre-historic times, it is very difficult for us to
prove a negative. We cannot prove that there never
lived a Mr. Sun and a Miss Dawn, that this Mr. Sun
never embraced Miss Dawn, and that she never fainted
away or died in his embraces. There may have been
a Mr. Fire, and he may have eaten his father and
mother, and, as the Egyptians say, he may actually
have died of indigestion. But, on the other hand,
scholars and historians have a perfect right to sa)' that
it will be time to consider these theories when all
other theories have failed, and that in the meantime
the historical footprints of language ought not to be
neglected, but should be interpreted as all other ves-
tiges of creation have been interpreted.
What I wish to put clearly before you in this my-
thological saying about Agni is, that there are grains
of reason in all the heap of unreason which we call
mythology. The constituent elements of mythology,
when we can still discover them, are always perfectly
natural. Their supernatural appearance is the result
of growth and decay, of fancy and fun, of misunder-
standing ; sometimes, though rarely, of a wilful per-
version.
This is what comparative mythology teaches us.
It depends on us to draw from it those practical les-
sons which comparative studies will always convey,
if only they are carried out in a truly philosophical
and comprehensive spirit. There are two prejudices,
at all events, which a comparative study of the relig-
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ions of the world, and of the inevitable corruptions of
those religions may help to eradicate. The one is that
the ancient dwellers on earth were so different from us
that they can teach us nothing, that they cannot be
judged by the same standards, and that even if they
say the same thing they do not mean the same thing.
The second prejudice, prevalent more particularly
among a certain class of scholars, is that if poets and
prophets, belonging to different countries, say the
same thing, they must have borrowed it one from the
other. With regard to this second prejudice, where
is there any excuse for it ? If there is a thought in
the Veda it has grown up naturally and intelligibly, as
I tried to show in the case of Agni. If we find the
same development, or the same final result elsewhere
also, as, for instance, in Babylon, why should we say
that Babylon has borrowed from India or India from
Babylon ? Surely what was possible in one country
was possible in another also, what was intelligible in
India is intelligible in Babylon also.
When there is a real historical intercourse between
two nations in antiquity, that intercourse cannot easily
be mistaken. For instance, the very name of alpha-
bet proves better than anything else that the Phoeni-
cians were at onetime the schoolmasters of the Greeks.
But when, as in the case of the Veda, there is nu
trace, so far as we know at present, of any foreign in-
fluence, whether Semitic or Egyptian, why should we
look to Babylon, Nineveh, or Egypt and China, for
the antecedents of what shows to us its perfect natural
development on Indian soil ?
I know there are coincidences, sometimes very
startling coincidences, between the religion of the
Vedas and those of other races. There are startling
coincidences, as you have often heard of late, between
Buddhism and Christianity. But to the scholar these
coincidences are nothing as compared with the enor-
mous dissimilarities between these religions. If I
have tried to show you how the human mind, unas-
sisted by anything but the miraculous revelation of
nature, arrived in India, from the concept of fire at
the highest concept of deity, my object was to show,
by one instance that could not be gainsaid, that such a
process was not possible, but was real.
That is the only answer which the scholar can
give to those who hold, for some reason which they
have never explained, that it is impossible for unas-
sisted human reason to arrive at the idea of God.
THE ETHICAL IMPORT OF DARWINISM.
BY L. J. VANCE.
Several chapters in Professor Schurman's book
re-open a discussion which for a short time has been
in repose. What constitutes the science of ethics ?
In other words. Is there a scientific basis for morals?
Again, What is the moral sense or conscience of man-
kind? Is it supernatural and inscrutable, and hence
incapable of scientific analysis ? Or, is it a natural
and necessary product of human evolution, and con-
sequently capable of being accounted for (so far as we
can "account" for anything) by the doctrine of deri-
vation, or Darwinism? These are some of the ques-
tions debated between what we may call the "intui-
tive," and the "derivative" school of morals.
In the preface, the writer of the present volume
loudly proclaims his acceptance of the results of evo-
lutionary science in the domain of matter and in the
domain of life. It seems to me that Professor Schur-
man thus seeks to disarm a very obvious kind of criti-
cism in advance. For, in the next sentence he informs
us that, it has been "pretended" that the doctrine of
evolution invests ethics with a neiu scientific character.
Then follows a resume of the different chapters of the
book in which the conclusion is reached that, Dar-
winian ethics is a "piece" of speculation. And it is
near the close of the preface, that the professor makes
a most eloquent plea for what he calls "a popular
style."*
At this point we wish to enter our most emphatic
protest against the use, in ethical discussion of the so-
called 'popular style.' If, as the writer tells us (p. 20)
the first principles of ethics must be axiomatic, how,
then, are they to be made 'popular'? Again, There
are axioms of morality, which, try as professors will,
we simply have to recur to and admit that they have
been clearly defined and stated before us. As a mat-
ter of fact, the first principles of ethics could no more
be 'popular' than could the propositions of Euclid.
It is well enough to talk about a "popular style" when
you mean the avoidance of obscure and technical
phraseology, or the employment of a clear and lucid
style calculated to instruct the popular mind.
But we need not go far to discover Professor
Schurman's true meaning. With all the skill of a
practised pleader the writer endeavors to enlist the
sympathies of his readers by the use of a 'popular
style.' Thus, we are told in the beginning that. Dar-
winian ethics is "purely imaginary " (p. 27 and p. 179);
that, if the evolutionary moralist would "brood in-
tensely" at the fires of the human heart (p. 31) ethics
would not be a "reproach"; that "the spiritual lead-
ers" of our generation bypassing their "guesses" for
hypotheses have brought ethics to the 'present de-
plorable condition' (p. 36). Hence, we need not be
surprised later on to hear that, these spiritual leaders
of our generation "take a grossly mechanical view of
human nature" (p. 146). And everywhere, the evo-
* "The Ethical Import of Darwinism," by J. G. Schuvman, Professor of
Philosophy in Cornell University. New York, 1887.
THE OPEN COURT. 2283
lutionary scheme of ethics is spoken of, either as 'ma-
teriahstic' or as 'mechanical.'
This, then, is Professor Schurman's idea of a ' pop-
ular style.' Now, to call Mr. Darwin's theory or doc-
trine 'mechanical' may indeed be popular, but every
student well knows that such phraseology is usually an
open confession of the fact that your opponent's views
are highly objectionable to }'ou. The phrases 'mate-
rialistic' and 'mechanical' are what Bentham called
"question-begging appellatives." They simply serve
to prejudge the very issue in hand. And if this is the
writers intention, we leave it to the Professor of moral
philosophy in Cornell to pass upon its ethical worth
and character.
In the first chapter. Professor Schurman raises the
question, What constitutes a Science? But I do not
find that he has at anytime or place answered his own
inquiry. After trying to discover whether ethics can
be 'likened' to logic, mathematics, or the natural sci-
ences we come to the following :
"If it (ethics) is ever to rise above the analytic
procedure of logic, it can only be by becoming one of
the historical sciences. Given the earliest morality of
which we have any written record, to trace from it
through progressive stages the morality of to-day ; that
is the problem, and the only problem which can fall
to a truly sa'entijic ethics. The discovery of these his-
torical sequences constitutes the peculiarity of the sci-
ence, which, like every other, presupposes observa-
tion, analysis, and classification" (p. 31).
This discovery, about which Professor Schurman
makes so much ado, has long been a commonplace
among the followers of Mr. Darwin in the study of
ethics. Indeed, we remember so able and so acute a
critic as Mr. Malloch finding fault with evolutionary
moralists because they time and time again insisted
upon ethics becoming a branch of human history.*
As Leslie Stephen tersely expressed it, "if ethics is to
become a science, it must rest on those facts and truths
which, when discovered and established would furnish
the basis of the science of sociology."
It is admitted, then, on every hand, that ethics
should be put upon a scientific basis ? Now, what is a
scientific basis? "By science," says Huxley, " I un-
derstand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and
reasoning of a like character to that which claims our
assent to an ordinary scientific proposition." Hence,
it seems to me that, if evolutionary moralists are able
to make good their claim that their ethics rests upon
valid evidence and sound reasoning, such ethics must
take its place as a part of science.
The relation of science to morality should now be-
come obvious. By scientific thought, said the late
Prof. Kingdon Clifford, we mean the application of
»See the Nineteenth Century for 1877.
past experiences to new circumstances by means of an
observed order of events. The uniform course of hu-
man action and nature is our best and highest warrant
for all moral deductions from human experiences,
either past or present. The great truth seems to be,
that all our practical rules of human conduct have
been severely Baconian. They have proceeded on the
ground that from a certain conjunction of antecedents
there always come certain consequences. In other
words, men living together in any kind of organized
society have deduced a priori from wide experiences
and numberless observations those rules of human
conduct which they found to be either mjurious or
beneficial to their social well-being. As a matter of
fact, we find that all our great maxims of morality act-
ually rest on a sound inductive basis. Thus it is that
many of our so called moral "intuitions" were once
only assumptions, afterwards verified by long-con-
tinued and wholesome experience.
But says Professor Schurman, you make these
"gratuitous" assumptions. "In the first place," says
he, "evolutionary ethics takes for granted the deriv-
ative character of morahty," (p. 133). Certainly it
does, we unhesitatingly reply, and we add, but not
without good reasons. If evolutionists make a "gratu-
itous " assumption the, burden is plainly upon Prof.
Schurman to prove it. By simply calling j'our oppo-
nents' facts and arguments, assumptions, the Professor
glides very easily over the whole difficulty.
Now the assumption of the evolutionary moralists
on the derivative character of morality is simply this
:
If (as they say) moral qualities were gradually evolved,
we should naturally look for some instances in which
they are not fully evolved, and consequently rudimen-
tar}', partial, or imperfect. Just such instances we do
find,—as, for example, among the many well-recorded
cases of intelligent animals, and among the many au-
thenticated accounts of morality of savages given by
Lubboch, Tylor, and Morgan. We see moral qualities
in the course of development in children, idiots,
and the feeble-minded. Above all, instances of the
mental training or education of the moral sense,
whether in the individual or in the race, are just so
many instances of the imperfection of the moral sense.
In truth, so long as the moral sense or conscience is
dependent upon the intellect to give just and proper
commands, just so long it is incomplete, partial, and
imperfect.
In the second place, says Prof. Schurman, "the
current expositors of evolutionary ethics have made
the radical assumption that moral laws are not cate-
gorical imperatives which command unconditionally,
but hypothetical imperatives which prescribe means
to the attainment of some end, they cannot escape the
problem of determining wherein consists that ulti-
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mate end, conduciveness to which alone gives moral-
ity its worth and obligation," (p. 135.) And hence
we find him combatting those moralists who have se-
lected as an ethical end,
—
pleasure; throwing the
shafts of sarcasm at those utilitarians who make man
"merely a pleasure-seeking animal;" hurling the
Carlylese epithets of 'pigs-wash,' and ' swines trough,'
at Mr. Spencer because the latter has said that "the
good is universally the pleasurable." Now, it seems
to us that Prof. Schurman is doing either one of two
things—setting up a man of straw labelled "Utilita-
rian," to be knocked down at his own sweet pleasure
—in which case no one will dispute his easily-acquired
superiority—or else he is only fighting an imaginary
Darwinist of some so-called " school"—in which case
we agree with Prof. Schurman that "the sure-footed
investigator here roams at random over an impalpable
void that offers no foothold," (p. 178.)
Again, there could be no greater mistake than to
suppose that Darwinism "reduces morality to pleas-
ure." The ethical import of Darwinism is not of a
rose-pink or Della-Cruscan character. The followers
of Mr. Darwin in the field of ethics indignantly re-
pudiate the Hebrew prophets' assertion that good can
ever be attained by eating "butter and honey."
(Isiah \TI, 16). That not only pain but punishment
followed a breach of the moral law, as surely as fire
burns, is the stern and salutary teaching of Darwin-
ism. And in this respect, it seems to me that, the
revolutionists have only given scientific form to the
ethical doctrine so strongly insisted upon by the
Stoics. In a remarkable essay on The Delay of Di-
vine Justice, Plutarch thus states the problem : "Were
the impious man to behold after his death, not his
statutes overthrown, or any honor received by him
cancelled,—but his children, his family, or kindred, his
city suffering great misfortune and punishment on his
account—he would not choose again to be depraved
and profligate—no, not even to obtain honors like those
of Zeus," (Peabody's translation, p. 51). Hence, the
followers of Mr. Darwin go so far as to admit good
has more often been attained in the past by pain and
suffering than by pleasure and sensuality. Yet they do
not hesitate to declare with the poet Browning— "All's
love, yet all's law." For, it was out of the cruel and
bitter struggle for existence great moral laws have been
evolved ; that the meek have now become the inher-
itors of the earth.
It is, however, when Prof. Schurman comes to his
third "assumption" that his treatment of the ethical
meaning of Darwinism becomes obviously narrow and
unfair. "I now come," he says, "to a third charac-
teristic assumption of current evolutionary ethics—the
fortuitous origin of morality through a process purely
mechanical, this must, I think, be regarded as the
fundamental tenet of the school," (p. 140). The rest
of the chapter is an attempt to show that a mechanical
origin of morality is the fundamental" assumption of
evolutionary ethics.
When, however. Prof. Schurman in his fifth chapter
comes to examine Mr. Darwin's account of the subject of
the origin of the moral sense, he takes quite an entirely
different task. As is well known, Mr. Darwin endeav-
ored to answer these questions: "Why should a
man feel that he ought to obe)- one instinctive desire
rather than another. Whj' does he regret having stolen
food from hunger?" It is equally well known that
Darwin in his "Descent of Man" put forward his fa-
mous answer to these questions with "characteristic"
modesty. Not so with Prof. Schurman.
'
' This problem, " he confidently declares, ' ' presents
no particular difficulty to anybody not pledged to a
system of derivative morality. The answer is simple
enough. Man perceives some desires to be higher or
nobler than others, he recognizes an obligation to ad-
mit the better and exclude the worse, and he cannot
defy his authority without incurring the penalty of re-
morse. Admit that there is a scale of worth and author-
ity among our impulses to conduct, as well as an or-
der of intensity, and the whole difficulty vanishes.
This however, is what our current evolutionary school
.... has persistently declined to do." (p. 190).
Whereupon he triumphantly asks at the close of his
argument, "What is there to carry the non-moral
possessor over into the status of a moral agent ? "
(p. 194). Or, again, "What marks of virtue, e. g.,
do you find in the shape or size, or cubic capacity of
the Neanderthal skull." And then follows in italics,
" There is no fossil pre-human morality." No ; neither
is there any fossil pre-human religion, science, or art.
Now because the evolutionist cannot trace, step by step,
the development of the moral sense, is that sufficient
reason for denying that the moral qualities could
ever have been evolved ? It is in such an ethical ar-
gument as this that our ignorance is made to play the
part of knowledge. I am inclined to think that Prof.
Schurman indicates an answer to his own argument
when he says that evolutionary science warrants the
belief that non-moral beings existed on our globe long
before the appearance of the only moral being we
know,—man, (p. 146). I would fain believe, with
Dr. George J. Romanes, that Prof. Schurman is only
playing in the hands of those who take a "mechani-
cal " view of morals, when he argues that "an ideal
of action may be affiliated to Darwinism as readily as
any other." {Nature, Jan. 26.)
Hence it is, I suppose, that Prof. Schurman urges
that evolutionary science, and particularly Darwinism
" does not necessitate a^cfc system of morals" (p. 160).
I am not aware that either Mr. Darwin or Mr. Spencer
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ever insisted that they were finding an)' new sj'stem or
basis for morals. On the contrary, as Haeckel well
said in his celebrated Munich address: "The ethics
of evolution does not need to seek for new principles.
We have onl}' to refer to their true basis the ancient
precepts of duty We look rather for the estab-
lishment of natural morals based on the foundation
of natural laws."
[to be concluded.]
SOUL-LIFE AND THE PRESERVATION OF FORM.
M.\N is not the sum of the material particles of
which at any given moment he consists. Ever}' man is
a special form that has taken shape in matter \ and
the material particles are not the really essential
elements that make him what he is. A man might
have eaten the meat intended for his dog, and the
dog might have gotten the piece that his master
ate. And so, too, the dog might have breathed the
air that the man breathed, and vice versa. But that
would have made no difference in the assimilation by
each of the material particles in question. In man's
stomachthey go through the process of being changed
into human flesh and blood, while that nutriment on
which an animal has fed will become part of the
animal.
This appears wonderful , and yet the principle
obviously accords with the simple law of mechanics.
Materials can be shaped, mechanically, into certain
forms. The shape of a bronze figure depends upon
the mould into which the metal is poured, and the
products of a machine, be they nails, or pins, or
needles, or books, or newspapers, or hardware, de-
pend upon the mechanism of the machine. The form
of the machine produces a special form of movement,
for the movement of the cogs and wheels will follow
the grooves and other mechanical contrivances ; and
upon the form of the movements necessarily the form
of the product depends.
The process of changing food into flesh and blood
is immeasurably more complicated than the work of a
machine, yet the basis of mechanical law is the same
in both. The difference of form in the product can
depend solely upon the difference of the mechanisms.
In the living mechanisms of organized substances, in
plants, in animals and in man, we can, with the
microscopical methods at our disposal, recognize the
rudest and roughest features only of the mechanical
differences in the innumerable parts which contribute
to shape the sap of trees and the blood of animals.
And these differences of form are the problems of
scientific investigation. We can appreciate the differ-
ences in the result, (say for instance between an animal
brain and a human brain,) we know also much about
the conditions which produced these different results,
\et we know little about the mechanical details of or-
ganisms, i. e., Jio'lc the living machines of animals and
plants assimilate food. But we have sufficient evi-
dence to believe, that the process is in full agreement
with mechanical laws, and that the problem is merely
a problem of form.
Man's soul does not consist of matter ; nor can it
be a substance like matter, such as are fluids or gaseous
and ether-like substances. Conceptions, that mate-
rialize the soul, are the materialistic views of spirit-
ists. It is not matter which makes of us that which
we are, it is not substance, but form ; and the forma-
tion of a man's life does not commence with his birth,
nor does it end with his death.
Our material existence is constantly changing, and
yet we remain the same persons to-day that we were
yesterday. How is this? It is because man's life
consists not of his material presence alone, but of his
formal being, and his formal being shows relatively
more continuity than his material existence. There is
a law of the conservation of matter and energy, but
there is another law of no less importance, which I
will call the law of the preservation of form.
We call it preservation and not conservation, in
order to mark the difference between the two laws.
Matter and energy are indestructible, but all special
forms are destructible, they are not conserved in their
kind or amount. Yet they are preserved; they remain
as they are according to the law of inertia until changes
take place which do not destroy the present forms,
but which alter them in the measure that special causes
affect them. The old form is in a certain sense fully
preserved even in a most radical change, for the old
form is one of the elements in the change. It maybe
destroyed in all that gives value to it ; its trace can be-
come infinitesimal; yet being one of the factors in
causation it can never be blotted out entirely.
The changeability of form constitutes what we call
evolution. Evolution indeed means 'change of form
according to certain laws.' Laws of form are geomet-
rically demonstrable, and laws of the changes of form
can be ultimately accounted for with mathematical
precision.
In Dr. Johannes Ranke's most excellent work on
anthropology* man and mankind are compared to a
wave. A wave appears to the eye as a material unit.
Its form travels along on the surface of the water, ever
one and the same ; but its substance is constantly
changing. It is the mere expression of a number of
rhythmical motions, and there are not two consecutive
moments in which the constituent particles are the
same. The drops which one moment are seized by the
approaching wave, rise in the next to its crest and
then ghde gently back on the other side of the billow
to the quiet surface of the ocean.
.
* Dr. Johannes Ranke: Der Meiisch, p. i.
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The body of the wave is formed by the particles of
water which enter into and pass through the wave.
Similarly the human body, like a wave of water, is a
certain form of rh3'thmical motions. Material elements,
the air we breathe, the food we take, are seized upon,
only to pass through and leave the body, whose form
continues and appears to the uninitiated as the same
material unit.
The same simile is true of mankind as a whole.
The activity of the human race, as we observe it in
history, rolls onward like a huge wave over the surface
of the habitable globe. It incorporates and transforms
the organic materials in its way only to give them
back to the ocean of unorganized material existence
from which they were taken. In the onward course
of human evolution, the generations of which it con-
sists rise into existence and sink back as the wave of
humanity rolls on. The generation of to-day is differ-
ent from the generations of former centuries, but
humanity is one continuous whole throughout all of
them. It began with the origin of life on our planet,
and its onward movement will continue as long as the
organic substance of the earth can afford sufficient
material to renew its form.
In all the material changes that organized bodies
undergo, there is a preservation of their forms. An
impression once made will remain, as a wound once
received will preserve the scar. The new formation
of the ever changing tissues will be made in the shape
which they possess. Scars will in time become in-
visible, but they will never be effaced entirely. A sen-
sation that has been once perceived will leave some
trace in the tissues of the living brain, and the form
of this trace will not be effaced amid the change of
matter that the nervous substance constantly under-
goes. It will be preserved ; and as soon as, through
the stimulus of nervous action, it is again excited, the
sensation will be revived, although it will be weaker
than it was when it first impressed itself. If the sen-
sation be strong enough it will be felt again, and may
be accompanied more or less intensely with conscious-
ness. Thus the preservation of form accounts for
the continuity of memory.
The identity of memory-structures does not de-
pend upon an identity of the very same material par-
ticles, but upon an identity of form in tissues of the
same kind. Nervous substance is the most unstable,
and its material changes are the most rapid of all. It
is therefore all but impossible that in the constant flux
of matter, the continuance of memory should be at-
tached to the material particles. It is a continuance
of form only, just as a fountain preserves its form du-
ring the uninterrupted change of the water. The
fountain-jet remains the same and we consider it in
different moments as the same not otherwise than
ourselves, because in the flux of its material constitu-
ents, its form remains constant.
The solution of the problem of memory, accord-
ingly, solves the problem of the personality of man
also. The personality of man and the continuity of
his soul-life, can find their explanation only in the
preservation of all the living forms of his organism.
Supposing that all motions of material elements are
accompanied by elements of feeling, we then under-
stand how feeling, as a special combination of its ele-
ments under special circumstances can originate in
organized substance. Further, we understand how
from simple and dim feelings specialized sensations
evolve as a kind of articulated feeling, and these
sensations naturally become representatives of the
objects which occasion them. When we notice in
a number of sensations their common features, and ob-
serve their differences, we begin to think, and we learn
to classify things around us under abstract terms.
Thus we understand how the soul of man with its
wonderful structures rises into existence, building one
tier above the other, and culminating in an .organ of
co-ordination which makes a comparison and unifica-
tion of all the elements of soul-life possible.
Man's soul was formed in the course of the evo-
lution of the human race, by the reactions upon the
external influences of the surrounding world, and the
present man is the outcome of the entire activity of his
ancestors. Thus every one of us can say with Christ :
"Before Abraham was, I am." Every one of us be-
gan his life with the beginning of all life upon earth.
We are the generation in which the huge billow of
human life now culminates. We, ourselves, are that
billow, our real self, our spiritual existence will con-
tinue to progress in that great wave.
Our existence after death will not merely be a
dissolution into the All, where all individual features
of our spiritual existence are destroyed. Our exist-
ence after death will be a continuance of our individ-
ual spiritualit}', a continuance of our thoughts and
ideals. As sure as the law of cause and effect is true,
so sure is the continuance of soul-life even after the
death of the individual according to the law of the
preservation of form. p. c.
TO THE POET-LAUREATE. *
BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
" Cursed be the social lies that warp us from the living truth ! "
—LocKSLEY Hall.
"Let us hush this cry of forward till ten thousand years are
gone " !
Let us stop the stars that, rising, light the night and bring the
dawn !
What ! is this our poet's counsel, he that urged us on the way ?
Must we stop because the wolves are howling at an ass's bray ?
* Copyrishted, 1887.
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Shall we turn because the million, menacing wi^h fire and sword,
Curse the cleaner hand we give them, bidding backward ? No,
my Lord !
You, yourself, have called the present "fatal daughter of the
past ;
"
How with all that men were learning, how could that old England
last ?
" Science moves, but slowly," said you ; science moves and turns
not back ;
Though we love or though we hate it, what she wills must clear
the track.
Those were pleasant days you tell of, we have lived them o'er with
you ;
Dreamt about the past and future ; now the time has come to do.
Those were days for gentle poets' sweet conceits and lady rhymes.
Now we need the man that, singing, fights the battle of the times.
iEschylus beat back the Persian from the plain of Marathon,
Brave Saavedra* fought the Moslem at Lepanto with Don John.
Sidney fell to save an army, fell, but left the word divine
Spoken to the wounded soldier— " Drink, thy need is more than
mine."
Perfect Sidney ! Hang the motto where the gilded dolts may see
How this gentleman demeaned him ; he was "English " as could
be.
Hang it where the curse is working, cursed greed of gain and gold ;
Markets, Senates, Courts of Justice where men's souls are bought
and sold.
Hang it where the public press, in sweating for the golden prize.
Reeks with every stench on earth, and makes a lie ten thousand
lies.
Hang it large above the pulpit where the priest on bended knee
Smiles upon his chosen flock and counts the millions he can see.
Well we know the time's corruption, deeply feel the burning shame,
Well we know the cure is forward ; let the cry be still the same.
When the man puts off his childhood, feels him free, and falls
from grace.
Can we fright him back to virtue with a shroud and painted face ?
Let us for a man's disorder find and use a man's restraint
;
Though we fail in reformation, still we save our sheets and paint.
Vines upon a leaning tower, tendrils of the heart, had grown
Till the living plant became as portion of the lifeless stone.
Crushed, the clinging vine lies prostrate ; guide is gone from sea
and land
;
For the tower was a beacon, but it stood upon the sand.
Raised again, but rock on rock, about the naked wall shall spring
Other vines to clothe in beauty, where the nesting birds may sing.
Men have lost the faith that led them, led with love or led with
fear
;
Some are weeping by the wayside, some have turned to scoff and
jeer.
Many who were bribed to virtue lack the sense of wrong and right,
More but need the common purpose that would arm the Just with
might.
Shall we waste divided power while the hosts of anarch greed.
Join to wreck our fair dominion with the hordes of anarch need ?
* Cervantes-Saavedra.
Let us raise on high the standard of a faith that changing time
Can but strengthen, broaden, deepen as it spreads from clime to
clime.
Faith in all the facts of Nature, facts the same for one and all.
Facts before which all men's reason needs must bow in helpless
thrall.
Though the rebel brute within us writhe in anguish at the sight,
Fact is Lord of Earth and Heaven, fact is truth, and truth is right.
Science, sifting less from greater, out of all shall form a creed
Ever growing with our knowledge, ever helping in our need.
But we'll change this name of science since the word has given
offense
;
Let us call it what it should be— simply ordered common sense.
Patience ! While the mind will ever marvel most when truth is
new.
Only time's unrivaled teaching brings the heart to love the true.
Hopes that hung upon a dieam are vanishing, and now we weep.
Look ! the glorious Sun is shining ; shall we turn again to sleep ?
Can we turn with all the splendor of the morning in the skies ?
Let us leave our dreams with darkness ; let us wake and let us rise.
With the hope that comes of courage, casting vainer hopes away,
With the strength cf resolution, let us out and face the day.
One in will, with force united, let us help our Mother-Earth
Feed and clothe her friendless children ; surely here is toil cf
worth.
Food and raiment for the body, all that needs to keep them whole,
But with these things not contented, let us feed and clothe tl e
soul ;
Fill the mind with all the vastness hidden by the noon-day light,
Fill the heart with love for all that wanders with us in the night ;
Till the something in the flower, till the something in the stone
Shall become as love within them—beating hearts that hear our
own.
Not so changed, illustrious Master, not so changed in all are we
;
Still the grateful heart remembers ; witness this our love for thee.
Courage, aye, and faith, O Poet ! Still when first the warm wind
blows
Little birds shall nest in England, hedges bloom and bear the
rose
;
England still has men and maidens fit for love and firm in need
;




To the Editor of The Open Court :—
I HAVE been attracted by your article in No. 140, (May i,
1890) of TIte Open Ciwr/, on " The basis of Ethics and the Ethical
movement." I am a member of the Society for Ethical Culture
of this city, and yesterday heard Professor Adler attempt to
answer the criticisms of your Journal, the Nation, and Mr. Abbot,
using substantially the arguments you attribute to him ; that our
duty is, do what is conceived to be the right, by the best class of
the community in which we live, and trust that in leading such a
life we may attain natures that will give us an insight into the laws
of morality or ethics ; the answer as you suggest is not satisfactory
in that it is applicable to the advancement of any end, and to each
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one of the community in which he lives, e. g., a monk in a con-
vent, may have special ends antagonistic to the general good.
Does not a preliminary question need solution ? Is any action
either good or bad except, as it affects, directly or indirectly
others ? If this relation to others necessarily enters into our con-
cept of a moral action, then is not the basis of all morality a
mathematical calculation of the effects of a particular act, by
which we can determine whether its benefit to others will be
greater than its injury, and the action be classed as good or bad,
by the result being plus or minus from a state of inaction. By
benefiting others I mean the harmonious development of their
social qualities. Raphael J. Moses, Jr.
New York, May 12, 1S90.
THE "WHY" OF THE MORAL OUGHT.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
Your recent article on the Basis of Ethics recalls to my mind
Comte's law of the three stages. Dogmatic religion no longer suf-
ficing, does not the error of our ethical friends (if it be an error
not to clearly formulate their definition of what the Ethical Move-
ment is) consist in still lingering in the transitorial metaphysical
regime ? If such basis, the theological having been abandoned, is
to be sought, it must be scientific.
To establish a scientific basis of morals the historical method,
rather than one of pure introspection, must be adopted. We only
correctly know man as he is by the study of mankind, and that in
all phases of social evolution. From the psychology of peoples to
the first dim concept of the Tribal Self the data must bs gathered.
One illustration will suffice. Why is theft wrong ? We clearly
realize that social growth would have been impossible where steal-
ing received the same approval as abstention from it. Clearly,
what in its very nature disintegrated growth could not promote it.
Nor does the typical case of the Spartans invalidate the statement,
for even then law formulated the moral ought.
But behind this, as underlying every social relation, there is
a broader generalization, or law, for in nature law is but generali-
zation of accumulated experience. Without entering into any dis-
cussion whether in studying the psychological li'e of a race, " the
national individual," this growth has been conscious or uncon-
scious, we have at least reached a period where we may formulate
the "why" in the above instance as the law of equal freedom.
Further, all study of the psychological evolution of the social or-
ganism will show that ethics have become more clearly formulated
pari passu with the recognition of more equal freedom. Though
our theologic 1 friends may not be disposed to grant this, I think
it still remains true that their own definition of the moral com-
mand. Thou shalt not steal, has a far wider scope of application
than with their grandfathers; e. g., in its application to slavery.
But if our broadest generalization is the law of equal free-
dom, in that what is right has ever been " selected " by social ex-
pediency, and has ever underlam, or governed (for in this case to
underlie is to govern), equitable relations, two conclusions follow :
I. Right is ever relative and determined by natural selection, i. e.,
it not only persists but becomes organic as the moral ought in so-
cial life. While the basis is thus shifted from the theological
regime, in becoming scientific, it is rendered positive rather than
dogmatic. In the species heredity being what personal identity is
for the individual, it results that what is morally expedient will
persist as the moral ought ; in other words, right becomes adapta-
tion to environment, said adaptation, or right, being violated in so
far as equal freedom is curtailed.
2. Ethical culture becoming scientific rather than metempir-
ical, based on social experience rather than personal introspection,
its progress lies in the study of what still restricts equal freedom,
i. e., equal opportunity to unequal capacities. Leaving the rari-
fied atmosphere of metaphysical table-lands for the fertile bottoms
where men delve and toil, they may find in economics fit ground
for exploitation. The ethics of rent and interest must be con-
sidered, for however expedient they may be for the furtherance of
ethical culture, if they are of the nature of privileges, artificial
rather than normal, and involving corresponding restriction of
equal freedom, or opportunity, they cease to be expedient for the
ethical growth ol " the national individual." And in seeking the
basis of ethics if they defend rent and interest as consistent with
the moral ought, they must seek to square it with the law of equal
freedom, or deny its ethical importance. If they accept the law
of equal freedom and pursue their inquiries into the ethical rather
than the temporary requirements of social relations, seeking the
"ought" rather than an apology, they may become equally per-
plexed lest their feet are logically directed to, and they unawares
find themselves in, the camp of the Anarchists !
Chicago, 111. Dyer D. Lom.
ASSISTANCE WANTED FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATISTICS.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
May I ask for the publicity of your pages to aid me in pro-
curing co-operation in a scientific investigation for which I am
responsible ? I refer to the Census of Hallucinations, which was
begun several years ago by the " Society for Psychical Research,"
and of which the International Congress of Experimental Psy-
chology at Paris, last summer, assumed the future responsibility,
naming a committee in each country to carry on the work.
The object of the inquiry is twofold : ist, to get a mass of
facts about hallucinations which may serve as a basis for a scien-
tific study of these phenomena ; and 2nd, to ascertain approxi-
mately the proportion of persons who have had such experiences.
Until the average frequency of hallucinations in the community is
known, it can never be decided whether the so-called " veridical "
hallucinations (visions or other "warnings" of death, etc., of
people at a distance) which are so frequently reported, are acci-
dental coincidences or something more.
Some 8,000 or more persons in England, France, and the
United States have already returned answers to the question which
heads the census sheets, and which runs as follows:
—
**Haveyou ever, 7uhen completely aioake, had a vivid impression
of seeing or being touched by a living being or inanimate object, or of
hearing n voice; which impression, so far as you could discover, 700
s
not due to any external physical cause ? "
The " Congress " hopes that at its next meeting, in England
n 1892, as many as 50,000 answers may have been collected. It
s obvious that for the purely statistical inquiry, the answer "No "
's as important as the answer " J t'^.
"
I have been appointed to superintend the Census in America,
and I most earnestly bespeak the co-operation of any among your
readers who may be actively interested in the subject It is clear
that very many volunteer canvassers will be needed to secure
success Each census blink contains instructions to the collector
and places for twenty-five names ; and special blanks for the
" Yes" cases are furnished in addition. I shall be most happy to
supply these blanks to any one who will be good enough to make
application for them to Yours truly,
Wm. James,
Cambridge, Mass. Professor, Harvard University.
BOOK REVIEWS.
Die Darwinische Theorie von der Entstehung und Umwandlung
der Lebewelt. Ihre Anwendung auf den Menschen, ihr Ver-
hiiltniss zur Lehre vom Fortschritt, etc., etc. By Prof. Dr.
Lud'a'ig Biiihner. Leipzig: Theodor Thomas. Price, 5 Marks.
I
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This is the fifth, enlarged and revised edition of Prof. Dr.
BUchner's popular lectures upon the Darwinian theory. They
were originally delivered in the winter of 1866-67 in Offenbach
and Mannheim, but in their present form embody the results of
the investigations of scientists up to the date of publication.
In this incorporation of new results Prof. Biichner has been accu-
rate and conscientious ; thus, we note, for instance, the discussion
of the researches of Weismann, published as recently as 1SS8 (an
exposition of which appeared last summer in the columns of The
Open Court). The extent of the revision and the scope of enlarge-
ment may also be judged from the fact that the first lecture, origin-
ally delivered say within an hour and a half or two hours, now
takes up some one hundied and nine pages. Prof. Biichner writes
in a graceful and picturesque style, that makes the reading of his
work a pleasure ; history and philosophy are presented in a way
that well accords with the purpose of the work. The last two lec-
tures are devoted to an exposition of the principles of the philoso-
phy of monistic materialism, or WirklUhkeils-Philosophie, as Prof.
Biichner would prefer to call it. This materialism, as our readers
know, is not, as the old conception of it was, a system, but a phi-
losophic view of life that seeks to discover and logically arrange
the unitary principles of the world of nature, wherein force as well
as matter is a fundamental and immanent principle. From the
day of the ascendency of this doctrine, says Prof. Biichner, will
date the renaissance of philosophy. The book is supplied with a
good index. //sp/f.
Balzac's Philosophical Novels. Two volumes: (i) Louis Lam-
bert, Facino Cane, Gambara ; (2) Seraphita, Jesus Christ in
Flanders, The Exiles. Boston : Roberts Brothers. Price
$1.50 a volume.
It is a laudable work that the Messrs. Roberts have under-
taken—this English edition of the Comedie Humaine. The trans-
lation, done by Miss Katherine Prescott Wormeley, is forceful and
elegant ; the philosophical introductions, supplitd by Mr. George
Frederic Parsons, are exhaustive ; the typography and presswork,
the French style of binding add to form a series of handsome
volumes. This superior edition of Balzac is beyond question the
one to be recommended to the English reader.
" It is not possible to classify Balzac's philosophy," says Mr.
Parsons. " The curie us student will find it reminiscent of many
systems of thought. From Plato to Proclus, from Proclus to
Hegel, he ranged freely, and took whatever he could assimilate.
As Hegel borrowed from Empedocles and Heraclitus, as the Scep-
ticism of Hume, and the Idealism of Spinoza overlap : so the
thoughts of men upon the deep problems of existence mingle and
flow from one to anpther. Any attempt to separate Balzac's ideas,
and to apportion them severally to their primal sources would be
worse than unprofitable, it would be misleading Balzac
worked over and informed with the light of genius the confused
mass of speculations absorbed by him in his reading."
This passage contains the key-note of Mr. Parson's critique.
The impossibility to classify Balzac's philosophy has led Mr. Par-
son (a thorough student) to go too deeply and extensively into
the history of philosophy, into literature proper, and into science
—at least, in our judgment it hjs. Instead of furnishing a con-
cise analytical introduction, Mr. Parsons has supplied a study in
philosophy, in which
—
particularly in Louis Lambert—the opin-
ions of Balzac have rather afforded a theme for independent de-
velopment than formed a subject for simple analysis. This is not
in the same measure true of "Seraphita"; though— and perhaps
with the end in view of making the books independently intel-
ligible—very much of the theory developed in the introduction to
Louis Lambert is there repeated. We are, of course, aware, in
saying this, that Mr. Parson's purpose may have been different
from what we have taken it to be. The question is entirely one of
fitness and advisability. As an independent study, with literary
unity of theme, the introduction to Louis Lambert is a valuable
one, and may be read with much edification.
We are assured, and heartily wish, that the Messrs. Roberts'
edition of Balzac will have the wide circulation that the pains
taken in its preparation merit. iinpii.
Ethisches Wissen UNO Ethisches H.-iNDELN. Ein Beitrag zur
Methodenlehre der Ethik von Dr. Pant Hensel, Freibur"
i. B.; 1889.
This pamphlet is a concise survey of the methods employed to
solve the ethical problem. The author discusses Evolutionism,
Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, pointing out the strength and the
weakness of each theory. Evolutionism, he says, can only explain
the ethical factors of moral life up to this day. Utilitarianism,
perfected by Bentham, can be considered as a regulative basis for
the conduct of whole nations. Intuitionism considers these theories
as insufficient for individual morality and finds a basis of conduct
in conscience. Yet there is no such consensus in matters of con-
science, as ought to be, for making Intuitionism satisfactory. Dr.
Hensel believes, that the opposition between Utilitarianism and
Intuitionism, is an expression of the opposition between two radi-
cally different conceptions of the world, the one standing upon the
principle of mechanical causation, the other upon a teleological
view on the ground of the moral consciousness of free will.
A NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL JOURNAL.
The two burning questions of the day, it appears, are those of
ethics and of psychology. And the psychological problem is com-
ing more and more to be discussed from a physiological stand-
point. We announced a few weeks ago the appearance of Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg's publication, and we have now again to
announce a new Journal of Physiological Psychology. It is
published in Hamburg and Leipzig by Leopold Voss, under the
title ZeitSihrift fiir Psychologie and Physiologie der Sinnesorgane,
edited by Herm. Ebbinghaus and Arthur Konig, with the assistance
of H. Aubert, S. Exner, H. v. Helmholtz, E. Hering, I. v. Kries,
Th. Lipps, G. E. Miiller, W. Preyer, and C. Stumpf. All these
names represent authorities of the first degree. Professor Ewald
Hering of Prague and Professor Wilhelm Preyer of Berlin, are
well known to the readers of The Open Court through several
essays published in previous numbers. Professor Hering has dis-
tinguished himself by his new theory of vision, which in later
years has received more and more attention. The names of the
Professors H. v. Helmholz and S. Exner are too widely and favor-
ably known to need any comment.
The first number of the Journal which now lies before us,
contains an essay by Prof. Helmholtz on the disturbance of the
perception of minimal luminar differences through subjective
light-production in the retina. Professor Hering discusses a topic
related to the theory of simultaneous contrast ; Hermann Aubert,
internal language and its relation to the sensory organs and to
motions ; Professor Sigmund Exner, the disappearance of after-
images in the motions of the eyes ; Th. Lipps comments on a
passage of Professor Mach's contributicns to the analysis of sensa-
tions, and Professor Preyer communicates a number of valuable
posthumous letters of Gustav Theodor Fechner (1887) Ceher
negative Einpfindiingsicerthe.
The new Journal will appear every second month, each num-
ber of about eighty pages. The first number is dated April 22d
1S90. Beginning with the second number, the editors propose to
publish current reviews of the work done in all departments related
to psycho-physiological investigations.
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"The .-ork will be read with an eager interest
and will profit by all who have followed the recent
developments of psychology- upon the basis of bio-
logical science."—Scoisffian, Edinburgh.
" It is a closely-reasoned and luminous exposition
of a genuine piece of psychological work."—
Natun.
•• A little book which everybody having the proper
training of children at heart, will do well to read."
— The Art Amateur.
"Those who desire to understand the drift of
psychological study will do well to read this book,




" It will be granted by those who are acquainted
with the past history of Psychology, that M. Ribot
has 1 ;ade a real contribution to this interesting
study."— TVii- IVeci, Toronto.
" Treats the subject exhaustively and would do a
man credit if it were his whole life-work ; but with
Ribot it has only been one out of many."—Aiuerican
Hebrew.
" The book is an important and interesting con-
tribution upon a difficult subject. "—/';'S/;cO//;;m«.
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CONTENTS :
Queries on all matters of general literary and
historical interest—folk-lore, the origin of proverbs,
familiar sayings, popular customs, quotations, etc.,
the authorship of books, pamphlets, poems, essays,
or stories, the meaning of recondite allusions, etc.
—are invited from all quarters, and will be an-
swered by editors or contributors. Room will be
allowed for the discussion of moot questions, and
the periodical is thus a valuable medium for inter-
communication between literary men and special-
ists. For sale by newsdealers.
Vols. I and II, bound, sent post-paid, on receipt
of $2 each.
Subscription, $3 per Annum.
ADDRESS :
THE WESTMINSTER PUBLISHING CO.,
No. 61J Walnut Street. PHCLA2SLP.-I1 i, PA.
BOSTON'S NEW MAGAZINE.
THE TRANSATLANTIC:
A Mirror of European Life and Letters.
(Issued on the ist and 15th of the month.)
THE PAPER'S AIM AND HOPE.
It is the aim of the Transatlantic to make easily
accessible to the people of this continent the best
fruits of the thought and literature of the other,
and to inform them of the other's progress in art,
society, and life. It exists for the purpose of les-
sening the enormous waste of good work due to
barriers of nature, nationality, and language. For
work is wasted in so far as it is not utilized to the
fullest, and certainly it is not so utilized as long as
the enjoyment of its results is confined to those
people who happen to speak one tongue or live on
The Transatlantic oversteps these barriers. It
journeys into foreign lands and says : " Give us of
your best. What are your newest discoveries in
science, your proudest achievements in art, your
latest productions in literature ? What are your
churches teaching, what are your governors doing,
what are your prophets predicting ? How do your
people live ? What are their fashions and follies,
what their virtues and vices, what their loves and
hates, what their deeds and misdeeds ? " For an-
swers to these questions it searches foreign liter-
eratures, especially the periodical press; then it
translates them into English, and offers them to
all who read that language.
The'TRANSATLANTic has no opinions of its own.
It gives voice to the opinions of all the great think-
ers of the world. It has no policy of its own, ex-
cept the policy of impartiality. It is what it claims
to be,—a mirror.
It mirrors a continent. It knows the value of its
reflections. It believes the people wilt appreciate
them.
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The Open Court Clubbing Rates.
The figures of the first column (to the left) repre-
sent the yearly prices of the various magazines.
The figures of the second column represent the
combined (net) subscription-price for The Open
Court and the magazine opposite. On orders for
additional magazines a discount of 5 percent, is
allowed.
Architects and Builders Edition of Scien-
tific American $2. 50 S4-00
Arena 5-Oo 5.50
Art Amateur 4.00 5.25
Art Interchange without col'd plates 2.50 4.25
Atlantic Monthly 4.00 5.20
Century Magazine 4.00 5.50
Cosmopolitan Magazine—New Subscrib-
ers only 2.40 3.00
Cottage Hearth The 1.50 2.50
Current Literature , 3.00 4.25
Dawn The 0.50 2.30
Ethical Record, The i.oo 2.80
Forum The (New Subscriptions) 5.00 5.00
Forum The (Old Subscriptions) 5.00 6.00
Harper's Magazine 4.00 5.00
Harper's Weekly 4.00 5.20
Life-Lore 1.50 325
Lippincott's Magazine 3.00 4.25
Macmillan's Magazine 3.00 4.50
Magazine of American History 5.00 6.00
Microscope The i.oo 2.75
Nation The 3.00 4.70
Nature (New York and London) 6.00 7.15
New Review 1.75 375
North American Review 5.00 6.00
Popular Science Monthly 5.00 6,00
Public Opinion, New Subscribers 3.00 4.25
Public Opinion, Old Subscribers, 3.00 4.50
Science 3-50 4-8o
Scientific American 3.00 4.50
Scientific American Supplement 5.00 6.00
Scribner's Magazine 3.00 4.40
St. Nicholas 3.00 4.50
Twentieth Century 2.00 3.50
Wide Awake 2.40 4.00
"GERMAN IA."
A Fortnightly Journalfor the Study of thc
•» GermanvLanguagevandvLiterature.
-f
Subscription price S3.00. Sample copies free.
A. W. SPANHOOFD,
P. O. Bos 90.
Editor and Publisher,
MANCHESTER, N. H.'
The Acade7ny, Syracuse, N. Y. :—We have before
us the first four numbers of this new magazine,
and feel justified in indorsing the favorable opin-
ion expressed by the daily press and some of our
leading college professors of German On the
whole, Germania is well adapted to the private
study of German, and, we are sure, will be wel-
comed by teachers as a pleasant companion to the
usual test-books. Even at the present rates for sin-
gle copies teachers will find in its columns varied
and interesting reading for their classes, at a rea-
sonable rate. We urge all teachers of German to
the magazine with this object in view.
Post Free for Twelve Months for Si. 25 Prepaid.
LIFE-LORE:
A MAGAZINE OF POPULAR NATURAL
HISTORY.
EDITED By IV. MAIVER, F.G.S.
Esses Hall, 4 Esses Street, Strand, London. W.C.
The Subject-Matter is Life—Life in all its
forms, plant and animal, from the " lowest " to the
"highest," recent and estinct.
No. I WAS ISSUED JULY i, 188S.
"The strong grasp of an unusually competent
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By Tho7>tas H. Huxley and Grant Allen.
Paper, Octavo : 15 Cents, Post paid.
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